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1. Introduction1 
There is among many philosophers a recurring attraction to the idea of philosophy as conceptual 
analysis: namely, that philosophy has as its aim the clear explication of the central terms 
governing ordinary and scientific thought. This idea can be traced back even to Plato’s Socrates, 
who at least initially used dialogues to draw out clearer definitions from his interlocuters of key 
terms such as virtue, knowledge, and justice. For Plato, at least at one stage, such explication can 
result in genuine and deep knowledge, even if this is only a more explicit and recollected form of 
a knowledge that was once merely implicit; he used the concept of forms (eidé) to say what the 
object of such knowledge is. For later thinkers, especially linguistically minded philosophers of 
the twentieth century, the attraction of the ‘conceptual conception’ of philosophy was not to 
credit philosophy with a distinct form of knowledge as much as to distinguish its activity from 
empirical science. Philosophy was to be regarded not as a first-order inquiry into a special set of 
rational objects, but a second-order determination of meanings in support of the claims of first-
                                               
1 The present version of this paper benefitted from comments and discussion with fellow participants at the 
conference in Prague. I would especially like to thank Paul Cobben, David James, and Christian Krijnen for valuable 
discussion. 
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order sciences. It was, in fact, essential to this conception that conceptual analysis not introduce 
anything that was not at least implicit in ordinary empirical judgments.2  
 Though the conceptual conception of philosophy perennially attracts as many critics as it 
does adherents, it seems to reappear in a new form with each generation.3 Absent the conceptual 
conception, the line between philosophy and other disciplines tends, for better or worse, to blur. 
Nevertheless, a central strand of dissatisfaction with this conception may be identified in its post-
Platonic modern form. This is that conceptual analysis seems only (and often by design) to 
express what we mean rather than how things are, or what is true. There seems to be no standard 
of correctness or objectivity, especially if conceptual analysis involves an appeal to merely 
subjective “intuitions.”4 Critics demand that philosophy be held to a higher standard than this, 
and even that philosophy as currently practiced does meet higher standards of knowledge or 
truth. Older conceptions of conceptual analysis could make assumptions about the objective 
validity of concepts that are no longer admissible. For example, in the eighteenth century Moses 
Mendelssohn could write: “All our concepts are like the seeds of grain of dying plants which, as 
bad as they look, are nonetheless full of inner virtue and conceal forests of beauty in their husks” 
(1997, 271-72). Mendelssohn believed that an analysis of the concept of something would lead to 
knowledge of its nature, but this by virtue of the theological catchall of preestablished harmony. 
For us, however, attributing truth to the products of conceptual explication may seem to be a 
form of epistemic self-congratulation.  
                                               
2 See especially Schlick (1931, 56): “And the totality of sciences, including the statements of daily life, is 
the system of cognitions. There is, in addition to it, no domain of ‘philosophical’ truths. Philosophy is not a system 
of statements; it is not a science. … [P]hilosophy is that activity through which the meaning of statements is 
revealed or determined.” 
3 See, e.g., Part II (“Conceptual Analysis and the Naturalistic Challenge”) of D’Oro and Overgaard (2017) 
for some recent accounts.  
4 Machery (2017) details criticisms of the use of intuitions stemming from thought experiments (“the 
method of cases”) to provide modal or conceptual knowledge in philosophy.  
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Absent such a theological device or a world of Platonic forms, there seems to be nothing 
on which to hang the validity or truth of conceptual analysis. Let us call this the authority 
problem of conceptual analysis. (It will be seen later why “authority” is felicitous here.) The 
problem breaks into two parts. On the one hand, conceptual analysis seems to lack objective 
authority: namely, we lack the presumption that the explication of meaning can express how 
things are. On the other hand, conceptual analysis may seem to lack intersubjective authority. 
That is, lacking objective authority, it cannot even properly articulate what we mean by our 
concepts, and instead expresses the parochial conceptual schemes of individual I’s.5 In this 
paper, I wish to show that Hegel’s understanding of concepts and their role in constructing the 
social world helps to solve the authority problem of conceptual analysis, at least in the domain of 
socially-oriented (sittliche) philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy can in this way be considered an ally 
to the conceptual conception of philosophy in a contemporary form. 
While I will not simply identify Hegel’s metaphilosophy as conceptual analysis of the 
linguistic variety,6 it is worth noting that there are enough similarities between the approaches to 
merit more than a superficial comparison.7 Hegel frequently insists that philosophy is 
distinguished from other areas of inquiry by its uniquely conceptual character, and, much like the 
twentieth century variety, Hegel thinks of one of the distinguishing marks of conceptual inquiry 
as its non-empirical character.8 At times, moreover, Hegel even makes use of the metaphor of 
                                               
5 For criticisms along such lines, see Baz (2017, 47). Machery (2017, Ch. 4) argues that philosophical 
intuitions are also culturally parochial. 
6 Yet see the work of Stekeler-Weithofer (1992, 2005, 2013) for the perhaps the boldest claim that Hegel is 
a conceptual analyst avant la lettre (2005, 9).  
7 Quotations from Hegel (unless otherwise specified) will cite the 1969 German Werke edition, the English 
translation, and (if applicable) the section or paragraph number. See Abbreviations of key works. In citations from 
the Encyclopedia or Philosophy of Right, “R” refers to the paragraph remarks added by Hegel, and “Z” to Zusätze 
(additions), added from Hegel’s students’ lecture notes.  
8 “[P]hilosophical thinking has its own peculiar forms, apart from the forms that they [philosophy and the 
empirical sciences] have in common. The universal form of it is the concept” (EL 52/33/§ 9). Hegel strongly 
criticizes an empirical conception of conceptual content in “The Concept in General” from the Doctrine of the 
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analysis to describe the form of conceptual thinking.9 Clearly, Hegel would not think of the 
proper form of conceptual analysis as a piecemeal enterprise, but rather a systematic and holistic 
one. The same is true, however, of the many of the classical proponents of twentieth century 
conceptual analysis.10 Hegel does not identify concepts with the meanings of terms in ordinary 
language (cf. WL II: 406/628), but neither do most twentieth-century analysts. On both 
conceptions, an analysis of meaning may introduce a local revision into our way of thinking. 
These similarities do not entitle us to identify Hegel’s method as conceptual analysis. But even 
so, differences between the Hegelian and twentieth century conceptions of philosophy do not 
mitigate the shared need to explain how it is that the expression of a concept or system of 
concepts (especially if they are not grounded through direct empirical intuition) is sufficient for 
truth in some sense. My suggestion will be that Hegel’s solution to this problem in the social 
realm is broad enough to generalize to a solution for a conceptual conception of philosophy. 
 I will argue that Hegel’s concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) provides the basis of his 
solution to the authority problem of conceptual analysis in both its dimensions. Hegel’s concept 
of ethical life is important because it reveals a domain in which concepts are not merely 
representative, but constitutive, of reality. This shows how a concept can have objective 
authority in that domain. On the other hand, given that ethical life is not only conceptually but 
socially constituted, the problem of intersubjective authority is of a different nature. Hegel’s 
                                               
Concept. See WL II: 257-69/517-25. He is elsewhere committed to the importance of empirical inquiry as preceding 
philosophy, especially in the philosophy of nature (cf. EN § 246). But this does not preclude the distinction of 
conceptual and empirical inquiry for Hegel.  
9 “[Q]uite generally, the whole course of philosophizing, being methodical, i.e., necessary, is nothing else 
but the mere positing of what is already contained in a concept” (EL 188/141/§ 88R). Just prior, Hegel describes the 
deduction of a concept as “to this extent entirely analytic.” 
10 See especially Ryle: “[T]he philosopher’s task is never to investigate the modus operandi just of one 
concept by itself; the task is always to investigate the modus operandi of all the threads of a spider’s web of inter-
working concepts…To fix the position of one concept is to fix its position vis-à-vis lots of others” (1971, Vol. 1, 
[1962], 189). 
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account does not solve it—because it turns out not to be a philosophical problem at all—but 
shows rather how the institutions of the modern world itself are attempts to solve it practically 
and pedagogically. In short, the second problem is a key problem of modern politics as such. In 
the first section of this paper, I will lay out some interpretive groundwork on my conception of 
Sittlichkeit in relation to Hegel’s theory of concepts and their realization from his Logic. Here it 
will become clearer what sense of “conceptual analysis” can appropriately characterize Hegel’s 
ethical philosophy. In the second section, I will show how Hegelian Sittlichkeit provides the 
foundation of a social ontology, and that social ontology is widely recognized as permitting 
“transparent” conceptual access. Finally, I show that Hegel’s use of social ontology to explain 
conceptual authority does not allow philosophy to adopt an authoritarian attitude toward 
concepts. Rather, in modern ethical life, the truth of conceptual analysis is co-constituted by the 
rational evaluations of fellow institutional participants. 
 
2. Modern Ethical Life as the Realization of the Concept 
 The foundation of Hegel’s philosophical method in the realm of political philosophy is his 
conviction that modern ethical life involves the realization of “the concept” (der Begriff). In this 
section, I will try to show how the realization of the concept is central to Hegel’s project 
especially in the Philosophy of Right. The realization of the concept in modern ethical life 
becomes the foundation for a philosophical method centered on the explication of a system of 
concepts. To put the issue somewhat crudely, it is ultimately because concepts are the ‘input’ of 
modern ethical life that philosophy can produce a conceptual ‘output’: a system of concepts that 
expresses the nature of actual modern institutions.  
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 Hegel tells us in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right that the “subject-matter of 
the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right, i.e. the concept of right together with the 
actualization of that concept” (GPR 29/17/§ 1). He goes to explain that philosophy is not 
concerned with concepts in the sense of mere general abstract representations, but rather with 
“the concept” which “has actuality, and further…gives this actuality to itself” (29/17/§ 1R). 
Hegel’s use of der Begriff in the singular is somewhat notorious.11 However, in the context of the 
Philosophy of Right, it becomes clear that the singular concept that is of interest is right, or as it 
is defined, the existence (Dasein) of freedom (§ 30). As such, right represents the complete 
practical aims of concrete subjects. The reality of the concept of right also involves the 
development of a number of ‘lower’ concepts which are necessary for its realization. As Hegel 
says later, “The determinations of the concept in the course of its development are form one 
point of view themselves concepts, but from another they take the form of existents, since the 
concept is in essence Idea” (85/49/§ 32). Thus, even though Hegel speaks of the concept in 
singular terms, this singular concept also “engenders and dissolves the particularizations of the 
universal” (84/48/§ 31R). So the development of the one concept is equally a development of a 
system of related concepts, each of which are necessary for the existence of right. 
 In describing the realm of right as the realization of the concept, Hegel develops a theme 
in Kant and Fichte’s practical philosophy. Kant and Fichte treated theoretical and practical 
cognition as holding asymmetric relations to their objects. A theoretical concept is beholden to 
an object that already exists, which it is accountable to represent. A practical concept, by 
contrast, represents an object that the subject aims to bring about. The object is accountable to 
the concept. Kant writes of the “ought” of practical reason: “Now this ‘ought’ expresses a 
                                               
11 See Wolf (2018) for a fuller account of the approach taken here to Hegel’s Begriff.  
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possible action, the ground of which is nothing other than a mere concept” (A 547-48/B 575-76; 
emphasized). Kant calls the general “faculty” to cause an object by means of a representation 
“desire” (Begierde): “The faculty of desire is a being’s faculty to be by means of its 
representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations” (Ak. 5: 9/1997, 
8). There is in practical reason a form of conceptual causality.  
 This idea is developed at greater length in Fichte’s practical writings. He explains that the 
agreement of concept and reality is inverted in the case of practical cognition. In this case, 
“[W]hat is objective is supposed to follow from what is subject; a being is supposed to result 
from my concept (the concept of an end [Zweckbegriff])” (FW IV: 2/2005, 8; emphasized). A 
practical concept is specifically a purpose, and realization of that concept results in a new 
“being.” Fichte calls such beings “products of freedom” and defines them thus: “A reality that 
has its ground in a concept is called a product of freedom” (134/128). Going beyond Kant, Fichte 
believes we can have cognition of such products, namely as the objective deeds resulting from 
freedom: 
The concept (of an end) immediately becomes a deed [wird zur That], and the deed 
immediately becomes a (cognitive) concept (of my freedom)…It would have been quite 
correct to deny that freedom can be an object of consciousness; freedom is indeed not 
something that develops by itself, without any assistance from a conscious being, in 
which case the latter would only have to be an observer. Freedom is not the object but the 
subject-object of a conscious being. (137/130-31; italics mine) 
Unlike Kant, then, Fichte does not rule out that we can have some objective knowledge of the 
results of free practical achievement.  
 When Hegel speaks of the philosophy of right as the realization of a concept, I believe 
this Kant-Fichte background should be held in view. Though these thinkers glimpsed the idea 
that concepts can be causes in practical causes, they did not anticipate the full scope Hegel would 
give to this idea. Hegel’s development of Kant and Fichte’s idea of practical-conceptual causality 
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can be found in the Science of Logic. Just as Fichte credited Zweckbegriffe as causes, so Hegel 
speaks of a teleological process as “the translation of the concept that concretely exists distinctly 
as concept into objectivity; as we see, this translation into a presupposed other is the rejoining of 
the concept through itself with itself” (WL II: 454/664). Likewise, Hegel sees the teleological 
process as yielding an object that is conceptually constituted, namely the “product” of the 
process: “[T]he product is an objectivity which is identical with the concept, is the realized 
purpose in which the side of being a means is the reality itself of the purpose” (459/667). In the 
context of the Logic, Hegel is treating teleology only according to its logical structure, and not as 
identical either to a natural or social process. For Hegel, teleology is logically pertinent because 
it involves a universal determining itself in an object, rather than objects determined by a 
universal externally.13 Nevertheless, when Hegel comes to discuss practical cognition (“The Idea 
of the Good”), there is a clear implication that human practical cognition leads to objective 
results in the way his discussion of teleology anticipates. On the cusp of his introduction of the 
“absolute Idea” he speaks of the way the knowing subject can encounter an objective world that 
is the result of the realization of practical purposes:  
Thus the subject now exists as free, universal self-identity for which the objectivity of the 
concept is a given [eine gegebene], just as immediately present [vorhandene] to the 
subject as the subject immediately knows itself to be the concept determined in and for 
itself. Accordingly, in this result cognition is restored and united with the practical idea; 
the previously discovered reality is at the same time determined as the realized absolute 
purpose, no longer an objective of investigation, a merely objective world without the 
subjectivity of the concept, but as an objective world whose inner ground and actual 
subsistence is rather the concept. This is the absolute idea. (548/733-34; italics mine) 
                                               
13 “[P]urpose [Er = Der Zweck]… manifests rationality [Vernünftigkeit] by being the concrete concept that 
holds the objective difference in its absolute unity. Within, therefore, it is essentially syllogism. It is the self-equal 
universal; more precisely, inasmuch as it contains self-repelling negativity, it is universal though at first still 
indeterminate activity. But since this activity is negative self-reference, it determines itself immediately and gives 
itself the moment of particularity, and this particularity, as likewise the totality of the form reflected into itself, is 
content as against the posited differences of the form. The same negativity, through its self-reference, is just as 
immediately the reflection of the form into itself and singularity.” (WL II: 445-46/657-58; italics mine) 
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Here Hegel takes a step beyond Kant and Fichte. Both of them acknowledged that practical 
reason has a different kind of cognitive content than theoretical cognition, but neither of them 
sufficiently realized that the results of rational activity can themselves be theoretically cognized. 
There is, namely, an objective world whose “inner ground and actual subsistence is…the 
concept.” This is especially the logical-metaphysical groundwork for the concept of “ethical 
life.” 
 Thus, the Philosophy of Right carries out in a specific way a possibility described in the 
Logic: for a concept to be realized as an objective world through a teleological process. 
Specifically, Hegel thinks that <right> as such represents the concept that can be realized 
practically. Ethical life is his term for what right is when it is objectively realized.14 This is why 
ethical life is not just the concept but also the “Idea of freedom” (GPR § 142): the concept of 
right together with its actualization (§ 1). It is “the concept of freedom that has become the 
present world [vorhandene Welt] as well as the nature of self-consciousness” (292/155/§ 142; 
modified). This Idea is specifically manifest in the “laws and institutions” of the objective social 
order (§ 144), which are also constitutive of the subjects of ethical life (§ 147). Namely, the laws 
and institutions of ethical life realize purposes that the subject can recognize as his or her own (§ 
152). For this reason, the subject of modern society can have true and adequate conceptual 
knowledge of the institutions of ethical life (§ 147R, § 152R). For if the connection with Kant 
and Fichte detailed above is on the right track, conceptual knowledge will be coextensive with 
the knowledge of a realized practical purpose. The conceptual explication of modern ethical life 
                                               
14 See already in the Phenomenology: “[I]f we bring out this still inner spirit as the substance that has 
already advanced to its existence [Dasein], then in this concept the realm of ethical life opens up. For this is nothing 
else than, in the independent actuality of individuals, the absolute spiritual unity of their essence” (PhG 264/141/§ 
349; slightly modified). 
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will be at the same time an explication of the purposes implicit in modern institutions and how 
those institutions must be designed to carry them out.15 
 It is true, however, that Sittlichkeit cannot simply be equated with institutions that realize 
concepts. In its broadest sense, Sittlichkeit applies to the social institutions and customs, 
whatever their origin or quality. Hegel’s claim is that modern ethical life, in contrast to other 
historical forms, realize “the concept” in the sense of a system of purposes that subjects 
themselves can identify with. Hegel points out, for example, that in Roman law “there could be 
no definition of ‘human being’, since ‘slave’ could not be brought under it—the very status of 
slave indeed violates the concept of the human being; it would appear just as hazardous to 
attempt a definition of ‘property’ and ‘proprietor’ in many cases” (31/18/§ 2). That is, Roman 
institutions were such that no clear definition of the concepts human being and property, among 
others, were possible. A fortiori, these concepts were not adequately realized in Roman 
institutions. Even though there was “ethical life” among Romans, this ethical life was not the 
realization of purposes that could be conceptually explicated. Because the basis of modern 
institutions, according to Hegel, is the recognition of subjectivity, these institutions are 
appropriately described as “realizations of the concept” in a way that others are not.  
 In the modern world, then, institutions of ethical life have a privileged relation to 
conceptuality which we will explore at greater length in what follows. From what I have said so 
far, however, I hope a few ideas will have become clear. First, in contrast to the merely 
theoretical use of concepts to represent an objective world, Hegel builds on Kant and Fichte in 
claiming that concepts can help constitute an objective world. Second, Hegel’s claims in the 
                                               
15 I thus do not see the “logical necessity” of the conceptual transitions of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as in 
competition with their “practical necessity,” as does James (2017b). For if sittliche concepts are purposive, then their 
logical content will also be paradigmatically practical.  
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Philosophy of Right assume that in the modern world, the practical aims of subjects have already 
helped to constitute the institutions of ethical life. For this reason, Hegel can rely on a conceptual 
explication of these institutions to articulate their very nature. That is, conceptual analysis has 
objective authority in modern ethical life. We will explore this idea in the next section.  
   
3. Social Ontology and the Objective Authority of Concepts 
From what has been said so far, one might think that there is still too much distance between 
Hegel’s conceptual practice in the Philosophy of Right and anything that goes by the name of 
conceptual analysis for Hegel’s practice to contribute to any general metaphilosophical solutions. 
However, Hegel’s belief that the modern world already enjoys the realization of a system of 
purposive concepts seems to entail that commonly accessible linguistic concepts are closely 
connected to the purposes in question. Hegel sees the articulation of conceptually necessary 
purposes as going together with the exemplification of these purposes in common notions and 
language:  
The truth is that in philosophical knowledge the necessity of a concept is the principal 
thing; and the process of its production as a result is its proof and deduction. Then, once 
its account has been shown in this way to be necessary on its own account, the second 
step is to look round for what corresponds to it in our ideas [Vorstellungen] and language. 
(GPR 31-32/19/§ 2R) 
Thus, Hegel does not suppose that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
representations and linguistic meanings used in ordinary life and the concepts that will be made 
explicit in a systematic theoretical treatment. Nevertheless, because he believes that modern 
subjects can be satisfied with the institutions of the modern world as actual, he also thinks that 
we can “look round” to see that these concepts are typically bound up with our current linguistic 
practices. 
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 However, this view by itself may seem only to exacerbate the problem of the objective 
authority of concepts as described in the introduction. To reiterate, why should we take an 
analysis of ‘what we mean’ to be any clue to how things are? When one considers a purely 
theoretical context such as that of natural science, this pathway seems foreclosed. As Francis 
Bacon bluntly insisted in the New Organon: “There is no soundness in our notions whether 
logical or physical…All are fantastical and ill defined” (Bacon 1999 [1620], 91, Book I, 
Aphorism 15). Bacon’s universal depreciation of the value of our empirically unrefined concepts 
may be too extreme, but his basic point seems to hold of many putatively scientific concepts. We 
should not, for example, examine what lies in the concept heat to understand its nature. For more 
than likely or ordinary notion in such a case is “false, confused, and over hastily abstracted from 
the facts” (66). An analysis of heat as we commonly understand it would have no objective 
authority. Moreover, an improved concept of heat will not be found by a more perspicuous 
analysis but by a closer examination of “the facts”. And isn’t this the general case? 
 Not necessarily. I take Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit as the “Idea” as a way of 
explaining why things are different in some cases. We may not understand the nature of water, 
or quarks, or heat, even if we frequently refer to them; and it would not be incoherent to say that 
such things like “quarks” exist, even though no one correctly understands them.16 And we cannot 
simply introspect, or enter a Socratic dialogue, to understand such phenomena just in virtue of 
our implicit mastery of the terms. As Hegel writes in an illuminating Zusatz:  
The laws of nature simply are what they are and are valid as they are; they are not liable 
to wither away, though they can be infringed in individual cases. To know the law of 
nature, we must learn to know nature itself, since laws are correct and it is only our ideas 
about them that can be false. The measure of these laws is outside us. (GPR 15-16/6; 
emphasized) 
                                               
16 This delicate possibility is defended at length in Brandom (1994, Ch. 8, sec. IV).  
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This feature, however, stands in contrast to the laws and institutions of ethical life. As Hegel says 
in the same context, here the human being “claims to have in himself the measure of what is 
right” (16/7). It may indeed be the case that you or I do not “understand” some institution such 
as, say, criminal punishment or the market. There will indeed be “clashes” regarding the nature 
of these institutions (ibid.). But it is incoherent to think that the just-mentioned institutions exist, 
but no one understands them. For, unlike the things of nature, an understanding must play a role 
in constituting these institutions. While in the realm of nature, we posit things prior to 
comprehending them, in the realm of “objective spirit,” the positing of something depends on its 
purposive, conceptual genesis.17 For this reason, a pattern of vengeful behavior among a group of 
higher primates, for example, simply wouldn’t be criminal punishment, as Hegel would say (cf. § 
102), because criminal punishment depends essentially on the notion of restoring “right” against 
an infringement (see § 97). That practice couldn’t come to be apart from an articulable concept 
of right. This is what I take Hegel to mean in seeing ethical life as an expression of the Idea. 
Criminal punishment exists in a way that is conceptually accountable, and this isn’t just the view 
of a few idealistically minded philosophers. To cease thinking this way would simply be to 
abandon the institution. 
 As I’ve said, this doesn’t mean that one can appeal directly to one’s own “intuitions” 
about criminal punishment to know its nature definitively—not to mention its justification. 
However, it does mean that a certain apparent epistemic timidity about the institution, what Hegel 
would call a “fear of error” that masks a “fear of truth” (PhG § 74), is an incoherent attitude for 
thinkers under the sway of that institution to take. Even to speak as if we need a “theory” of 
                                               
17 The important caveat must be added that a conceptual genesis may only retrospectively articulated 
conceptually. A rational purpose does not require explicit thought to be rational, but being rational, it can be 
explicitly thought. 
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criminal punishment (to stick with this example), as if it’s something there to be discovered, is at 
best misleading.18 The institution exists in such a way that it must have a conceptual basis if it 
exist at all. To understand if and why the institution is justified, one must simply show, 
conceptually, how it follows from the concepts it is meant to realize. 
 Hegel’s view about modern ethical life can be put in this way: the concepts involved in 
modern ethical life have objective authority because they help constitute a social ontology.19 A 
social ontology, roughly speaking, is the domain of objects that exists because of the way it is 
recognized by social actors. Though the objects of social ontology are not “mind-independent” in 
the sense that they could exist without human subjects, they are objective in the important sense 
that they do not depend on the imagination or desires of individual actors.20 The affirmation of 
social ontology is in this way distinguished from the antirealism of many social constructionists, 
who do not limit claims of social construction to explicitly social entities, but extend the 
explanation to what is putatively natural.21 A social ontology of Hegel’s variety uses the 
conceptual constitution of its objects as a distinguishing feature vis-à-vis the natural world.  
Some contemporary social ontologists are surprisingly in harmony with Hegel’s view on 
this matter. Even a realist and proudly commonsense philosopher such as John Searle can say of 
social ontology: “In a sense there are things that exist only because we believe them to exist. I 
am thinking of things like money, property, governments, and marriages” (1995, 1). Moreover, 
for Searle, such entities not only depend on our beliefs, but also on our use of language. He 
                                               
18 Hegel disregards the suggestion that we need a “theory” of the state (GPR 15/6; 26/15). He expands, 
“Theories [Theorien] are set over against what exists and are meant to appear correct and necessary in and for 
themselves. … [Y]et true thought is not an opinion about the thing but the concept of the thing itself” (16/7).  
19 See Krijnen (2015, 64 ff.) for further justification of the use of “social ontology” (in contrast to “practical 
philosophy”) in the realm of Sittlichkeit.  
20 For a recent argument that mind-dependence does in general preclude realism about a topic, see Khalidi 
(2016). See also Searle (1995, 9-11). 
21 For a helpful taxonomy of various conceptions of social construction, see Haslanger (2012, Ch. 2).  
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writes: “Language seems to be essential not only to represent these facts to ourselves; but…the 
linguistic forms in question are partly constitutive of the facts” (37). Searle evidently does not 
think the same is true of facts about water or quarks (177-97). As Hegel would say, these are 
“the Idea in the form of its otherness,” or even begrifflos.22 
Searle’s primary explanation of social ontology involves the way that “status functions” 
are attributed to objects, often in the form of “constitutive rules,” forms of collective agreement 
that enable new social realities. His favorite example is the way a piece of paper in a centralized 
economy has the status function money through collective attribution of this status. The general 
formula is “X counts as Y in context C” (28), where Y names a status function (such as the 
exchange value of money), and X some material object (such as a piece of paper). Facts about 
money would not exist, Searle contends, without collective attribution of such status functions. 
Once they do, it is an objective fact that someone has a twenty-dollar bill in their wallet. It is no 
longer just a piece of paper. Another contemporary social ontologist, Amie Thomasson, points 
out a limitation of Searle’s view. Namely, Searle supposes that social entities must have some 
relevant material basis. Thomasson (2003) points out that unlike paper money, not every object 
of social ontology has a material basis that is specifically necessary for its existence. She writes: 
“Corporations, laws and governments all seem to depend on the physical world for their 
existence, and are created by real and intentional acts of writing, voting, etc. Yet none of these 
abstract social entities is identifiable with some particular physical object or brute fact” (277). 
Thomasson does not suggest such entities could exist without a physical world at all, but that no 
specific material basis constitutes the entity. A law can be written in stone, communicated on the 
internet, or be merely verbal. Yet no specific material form is necessary for it to exist.  
                                               
22 Thus does Hegel often characterize natural phenomena. Cf., e.g., EN 25/15/§ 247Z and WL II: 282/536.  
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Thomasson’s de-materializing of Searle helps corroborate Hegel’s view that concepts can 
have near-complete authority in the realm of social ontology. Concepts do not only merely 
represent the world; some concepts also constitute the world. While one cannot assume that the 
analysis of a conceptual representation reveals the nature of the entity the concept represents 
(like water or heat), one can assume that the analysis of a constitutive concept can do so. In such 
cases, concepts have an ontological hold on the things themselves, and the things themselves also 
have an epistemic “transparency”. That is to say that there is no gap between what potential 
knowers know about social objects and what the objects are. As Thomasson writes:  
[F]acts of these kinds remain conceptually transparent; indeed certain facts about the 
nature of the kinds of social entities constructed by means of the last two kinds of rules 
must be known…Since those rules establish the relevant conditions, they must be correct. 
Thus nothing of the kind S can exist without there being S-regarding beliefs (indeed 
without members of the relevant society collectively knowing of certain sufficient 
conditions for something to be S, or for there to be an S). (2003, 283) 
Since conceptual knowledge is constitutive of the object, some conceptual knowledge of the 
object must always be extant.  
On this point, speaking generally, we have already seen that Hegel agrees 
wholeheartedly. In the realm of ethical life, human subjects are the “measure” of what is, and 
concepts express the thing itself, or its nature or essence. One might even wonder what prevents 
contemporary social ontologists from speaking again of “absolute knowledge”. For they admit 
that in social ontology, as Hegel says, “knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, … 
knowledge finds itself, and the concept corresponds to the object an the object to the concept” 
(PhG 74/38/§ 80). Even if one avoided talk of absolute knowledge, it is clear that conceptual 
analysis has objective authority in social ontology. One does not even have to be an “idealist” to 
see this. Or perhaps recognizing this fact is already sufficient to become something of an 
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idealist.23 What is clear is that concepts in ethical life need not exhibit the deference required by 
scientific theories.  
 
4. “Essentially Contested” Concepts and Intersubjective Authority 
Concepts can have objective authority in social ontology because concepts constitute the objects 
in question. However, “concepts” in this case are articulated purposes, and the purposes that are 
realized in extant social institutions cannot simply be assumed to be available to each individual 
served by (or indeed subjugated to) those institutions. It would be trivially possible in the case of 
every institution, even evil or largely irrational ones, to identify some concept or purpose as 
realized therein, but in many cases these concepts will not be recognized by the relevant 
individuals. How then do the concepts of modern social life—and therewith the philosophical 
explication of them—have intersubjective authority as well? How, namely, can I and you treat 
the articulation as a concept with something binding on us?  
 As I mentioned above, this problem is recognized in contemporary discussions of 
conceptual analysis, which often suppose that conceptual analysis proceeds by examining 
individuals’ “intuitions” on a subject matter. For example, whether the concept of person or self 
should be seen as including the body or only mental states or memories is seen to rely on our 
intuitive reaction to certain thought-experiments involving body swaps or uploaded minds. 
Unfortunately, ordinary individuals have different intuitions in many such cases. Even or 
especially so-called experts (professional philosophers themselves) cannot agree about the 
                                               
23 Hegel’s view is also rationalist in a way that distinguishes him from Searle and Thomasson, though 
space does not permit a detailed account of this feature. Suffice it to say that for Hegel, an institution following a 
single constitutive rule does not make it “conceptual” qua rational. For an institution to be genuinely rational, for 
Hegel, is not only for it to be individually dependent on human thought, but for it to find a place together in a system 
of reasons or norms that is right as such. This means the conceptual explication of right must take a systematic form. 
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analysis of concepts considered in this way.24 Even if there were agreement, it is unclear that this 
should be treated as anything but psychological uniformity, rather than evidence of truth.  
 If the privileged site of objective conceptual authority is that of Hegelian social ontology, 
however, this problem can be seen in a different light. Hegel’s conception of the realm of ethical 
life requires on the one hand that concepts are objectively realized, so that the social world is 
actual and enduring apart from the whims of individuals. But it also depends on the fact that 
objective institutions are the realizations of concepts that individuals can recognize as expressing 
their own purposes. Much as Hegel is reputed as an anti-individualistic thinker, I think the 
concepts he attempts to articulate as constituting modern ethical life are precisely those which he 
wagers as satisfying the considered purposes of the citizens of modern states. But this is also to 
admit that the concepts of Hegel’s political philosophy are expressed in the full knowledge that 
they are “essentially contested”.  
 I will explain the connection of Hegel’s philosophical practice with the notion of an 
essentially contested concept more directly in a moment. First it is worth making clear that Hegel 
sees the system of concepts he articulates in the Philosophy of Right as in some sense answerable 
to the purposes of modern individuals. To be sure, Hegel is often dismissive of the unreflective 
“opinions” and reactions of modern individuals, and he is unconvinced that a purely democratic 
basis for modern ethical life is possible or desirable (cf. GPR § 308R). However, Hegel also 
firmly acknowledges that the assent of the “subjective will” of individuals is essential to ethical 
life. “In right,” Hegel contends, “the human being must encounter his own reason…” 
(17/7/Preface Z.). Moreover, “the highest right of the subject” is “the right of giving recognition 
only to what my insight sees as rational” (245/127/§ 132R). Accordingly, speaking of the laws 
                                               
24 See Weinberg et al. (2010) for a discussion and criticism of the “expertise defense” of philosophical 
intuitions.  
 19 
and institutions that flow from ethicality, he writes: “[T]hey are not something alien to the 
subject. On the contrary, his spirit bears witness to them as to its own essence, the essence in 
which he has a feeling of selfhood [Selbstgefühl], and in which he lives as in his own element 
which is not distinguished from himself” (295/155/§ 147). The very aim of the philosophy of 
right, to recall, is to show what is required for the realization of concrete freedom. Even if this 
freedom is not conceived individualistically, it is freedom of individuals nonetheless. As Robert 
Brandom (2019, 11-16) argues, the normative statuses constitutive of modern ethical life 
(including rights and privileges) are ultimately instituted by the normative attitudes of modern 
individuals. Without those subjective attitudes, no modern institutions. The passage above even 
implies that the feelings of individuals (though not themselves responsible for institutions25) 
should be importantly in line with true ethical life. Though individuals may not be prepared at 
every time to consciously recognize when their freedom is realized in the fullest sense, the 
realization of their freedom is the measure of genuine ethical life.26 
 Thus, while Hegel does not have a subjective conception of the good, he demands that 
the good is subjectively satisfying. There is not only purely systematic criteria of adequacy for 
Hegel’s practical philosophy, but also the ‘external’ criterion of adequacy of the conformity of 
individual wills to the conceptual system as articulated. Despite Hegel’s occasionally 
paternalistic tone on such matters, it cannot be simply stipulated that the modern state satisfies 
the individual’s desire for concrete freedom, but must be recognized in the actual reactions of 
subjects of modern states to the institutions in which they find themselves. That is, Hegel’s own 
conceptual explication of the nature of modern ethical life must be accountable to the normative 
                                               
25 E.g., Hegel’s polemic against J.F. Fries, GPR 18-19/9-10/Preface. 
26 Hegel implies it is “the position of everybody” who live in the modern state (though not everyone 
consciously) that they “find satisfaction there for their knowledge and volition” (GPR 16/8/Preface).  
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attitudes to modern subjects. In terms of our present problem, this means that the concepts of 
social ontology can have objective authority only if they also have intersubjective authority. Part 
of what it means to provide a correct analysis of marriage, for example, is to give an analysis 
that is compelling for all those who will live under it.27 Here is what I mean by saying that the 
concepts of Hegelian ethical life are “essentially contested”.  
The notion of “essentially contested concepts” was introduced by the twentieth century 
Scottish philosopher W.B. Gallie (1912–1998) in a 1956 paper intending to explain the 
persistence of philosophical controversy. Concepts like art, justice, and democracy, Gallie 
claimed, are essentially contested because (among other reasons) they are both appraisive (they 
mark something as good or bad) and because they are involved in ongoing development that has 
no sharply defined end goal.28 To call something “art,” Gallie would contend, is to use a term 
contestably, since one is staking a claim to the work as carrying out goals of the practice of art 
that are only agreed upon to a minimal degree. There is no final court of appeal (an ultimate 
critic) for art, nor could there be. Now compare “freedom” as applied to a political regime. Like 
“art”, “freedom” designates so inchoately a political goal that it can be used to promote a 
spectrum of practices or institutions, including some evidently aberrant ones, however 
unfortunately. It is not obviously incorrect when an Orwellian totalitarian speaks of the 
“freedom” he has brought to a people; surely he can point to some descriptive similarity between 
his regime and common usage, so that it is not merely an equivocation. It is a way of 
                                               
27 This example is pertinent in the United States, given the way participants appeal to “definition” in recent 
debates surrounding marriage equality. See, e.g., Corvino and Gallagher (2012, 39 ff.; 102 ff.).  
28 The historical nature of an essentially contested concept is important to Gallie’s account (as it would be 
to Hegel’s), but I will largely abstract from that here. See Evnine (2014) for more thorough account of Gallie’s 
notion of an essentially contested concept that emphasizes the historical dimension. 
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“contesting” the concept for one’s own purposes. According to Gallie, one could not use such a 
concept without promoting some such appraisal.  
 In a similar way, Hegel admits that the general concept of right (and freedom therewith) 
that structures his account of ethical life is indeterminate at the outset. The realization of freedom 
involves “the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to the differentiation, determination, 
and positing of a determinacy as a content and object” (52/30/§ 6). What concepts and 
institutions adequately determine and specify freedom is in part a matter of how well they are 
evaluated as satisfying this inchoate concept. This does not mean that an arbitrary evaluation is 
possible. Indeed, Hegel thinks that subjects will see that precisely his account shows what kind 
of rational self-evaluation necessarily requires.29 But the necessity of the account does not 
preclude its essential contestability. It is arguably a defining feature of the modern liberal state 
that its citizenry is comprised of ‘contesters’. Modern individuals are “negative” subjects, who 
can subject the claims of freedom to criticism.30 
The authority of sittliche concepts is thus measured (and contested) not only objectively 
but also by the standards of the concept-users themselves. What does this mean about the 
problem of the intersubjective authority of conceptual analysis? If a concept were merely 
representational, it would be odd indeed to pay attention to individual differences in intuitions 
concerning the use of that concept. The representational use of a concept is supposed to be 
answerable to the object being represented, not to the representers. Thus, a deviance among 
                                               
29 Recall: “The truth is that in philosophical knowledge the necessity of a concept is the principal thing; and 
the process of its production as a result is its proof and deduction” (GPR 31-32/19/§ 2R). 
30 It is true that Hegel does not outline a substantial role for the dissent of individuals (see de Boer 2017). 
This is largely because of his desire to avoid letting particular interests determine the nature of institutions, which 
are meant to serve universally. Nevertheless, his lack of allowance for individuals to exert concrete political pressure 
in the state is not incompatible with the need for institutions to be rationally accountable to individuals. See James 
(2017b, 187 ff.) on the way that subjective attitudes may be transformed in the transition from civil society to the 
state proper. Education in a state, on Hegel’s view, must be devoted to leading individuals to “identify” with the 
universal qua state. 
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individual intuitions is most easily explained as a failure of correct representation on the part of 
some of them. However, a deviance among the intuitions for essentially contested concepts are 
significant for the content of those concepts. For here the content will be the same only where the 
goals and appraisals of the participants are the same. Difference among participants is in this 
case not necessarily a mark of the failure of some of them, but a failure of the practice (or the 
representation of it) to be compelling to all participants. 
Unlike the problem conceptual analysis’ objective authority, the problem of its 
intersubjective authority (in the realm of das Sittliche) does not seem, then, to be primarily a 
philosophical problem, but a pedagogical and political one.31 Since the phenomena in question 
are subject to change in light of changing attitudes of participants, the conceptual explication of 
the phenomena can only be unified if the institutions succeed in being rationally satisfying to the 
participants. Hegel thinks the modern world can be satisfying in that way, but whether he is right 
or wrong, his view implies that the conceptual authority is subservient to the tacit authority of 
modern individuals. This means that in some cases, unless a prior conviction among individuals 
holds sway, there may be no use in a philosophical explication. This should not be surprising, 
given Hegel’s view that philosophy “always comes too late on the scene” to provide instructions 
for how the world ought to be (GPR 28/16). There are clear limits, then, to the value of 
conceptual analysis. It cannot produce conviction ex nihilo. However, it still has a pedagogical 
role. It provides a reconciliation “to those in whom there has once arisen an inner voice bidding 
them to comprehend [begreifen], and not only to preserve their subjective freedom in what 
                                               
31 On this score, the reader may recall Hegel’s (egalitarian) pedagogical ambitions in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit: “The intelligible form of science is the way to science, open to everyone and equally accessible to everyone, 
and to attain to rational knowledge through the understanding is the just demand of the consciousness that 
approaches science” (20/9/§ 13). Hegel’s phenomenological pedagogy is evidently an attempt to lead the reader to 
identify with the historical transition to the modern world. Consciousness now can “turn to its own world and 
present [Gegenwart], discover it as its property” (586/318/§ 803).  
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substantially is, but also to stand with their subjective freedom in that which is in and for itself” 
(27/15; modified). This, of course, provided that subjective freedom has already become 
something substantial. Participants in modern institutions must assume this has taken place, but 
they are also its ultimate source. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Hegel shows how a ‘conceptual conception’ of philosophy may address two sides of an 
outstanding problem of conceptual authority. Most accounts of conceptual analysis assume that 
the content of a concept is a representational function, and this raises the problem of the relation 
of these representations to the truth. But Hegel contends that in the realm of ethical life, 
conceptual content is constitutive of the phenomena. To the extent that this is true, we should not 
concede that the concepts about the social world we inherit are only contingently related to 
things. Rather, we have reason to expect that a conceptual explication will tell us how things are 
with ethical life. For our concepts express the purposes that have been realized in ethical life. 
However, since modern ethical life is meant to be structured by institutions that are rationally 
satisfying to individuals, the contestation about conceptual content among individuals is an 
essential feature of philosophy in the modern world. Though I have referenced contemporary 
philosophers whose views are parallel to Hegel’s on a number of points, Hegel’s combined 
appreciation of the constitutive dimension of conceptual content, along with the special 
pedagogical and political problem that it creates in the modern world is unique indeed. Likewise, 
even where philosophers allow for the important dimension of artifactual or social concepts in 
philosophy, Hegel’s way of prioritizing the realm of Sittlichkeit in philosophy is still unmatched. 
Contemporary philosophy struggles to explain the value and ‘authority’ of conceptual analysis 
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precisely because it marginalizes the human world in favor of the natural. Hegel’s use of the 
concept of ethical life shows that concepts have authority not because we impose them on the 
world, but because part of the world is their product—and ours.  
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2. Abstract: 
While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone 
a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. 
First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating 
what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack 
intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial 
group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social ontology, focused on his concept 
of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both 
objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern 
institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. 
Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As 
many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions 
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are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have 
intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that 
this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, 
since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the 
practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have 
objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of 
philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments.  
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